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Abstract
The number of knowledge-based systems that build on Bayesian belief networks is
increasing. The construction of such a network however requires a large number of
probabilities in numerical form. This is often considered a major obstacle, one of the
reasons being that experts are reluctant to provide numerical probabilities. The use of
verbal probability expressions as an additional method of eliciting probabilistic infor-
mation may to some extent remove this obstacle. In this paper, we review studies that
address the communication of probabilities in words and/or numbers. We then describe
our own experiments concerning the development of a probability scale that contains
words as well as numbers. This scale appears to be an aid for researchers and domain
experts during the elicitation phase of building a belief network and might help users
understand the output of the network. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Bayesian belief networks, also referred to as probabilistic networks, were
first introduced in the late 1980s by Pearl [1]. Since then, an increasing number
of successful applications of such networks in dierent problem domains have
been developed, which demonstrates that they have established their position
in Artificial Intelligence as valuable representations of reasoning with uncer-
tainty [2–6]. A belief network consists of a qualitative and a quantitative part.
The qualitative part is a directed graph, where the nodes represent the domain’s
variables (in a medical diagnostic application the variables could for example
be a laryngitis and its symptoms such as a sore throat and fever) and the arcs
their dependencies. The quantitative part encodes probabilities over these
variables, such as the probability of some symptom given a diagnosis of
laryngitis.
Constructing the qualitative part of a belief network, although elaborate,
seems relatively straightforward and experts feel comfortable doing so. The
quantitative part, with the probabilities over the variables, is more problem-
atic. On the input side, it involves the elicitation from domain experts of
(conditional) probabilities for all variables. This may be a prohibitive quantity
of probabilities, even in restricted domains [7]. What is more, experts are re-
quired to express all these probabilities numerically, something they are often
reluctant to do. They do not feel familiar enough with the concept of proba-
bility or they find it dicult to attach a number to their beliefs [8]. On the
output side, explanations of the results of computations of the network in
terms of variables with numerical probabilities may be uncomfortable. Re-
searchers have recognised the importance of providing users with more easily
understandable explanations of the results, for which numbers may not nec-
essarily be the best option and verbal probability expressions are seen as good
alternatives [9,10].
Except in situations where the odds are objectively measurable, most people
feel more at ease with verbal probability expressions than with numbers. When
people communicate probabilities, they frequently do so in words rather than
in numbers. In the development of a computer system, viz. a belief network,
that is intended to reason with probabilities and to communicate the results of
that reasoning to users, the mode in which people normally represent proba-
bility needs to be taken into account (compare [11,12]).
However, it is not obvious which verbal probability expressions could then
be used. We therefore investigate whether we can find a set of verbal proba-
bility expressions whose meaning is agreed upon and which together cover the
whole range from 0% to 100% probability. A combination of this scale with a
numerical scale could then be an aid, both during the elicitation phase of
building a belief network and in understanding the output of the network’s
computations.
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We are not the first to study this problem. Bonissone and Decker [13] an-
alysed the use of linguistic terms to establish a certain granularity to facilitate
knowledge elicitation in possibilistic reasoning. In the next paragraph, we re-
view other researchers’ empirical studies on the use of probability expressions.
Results in favour of numbers as well as results in favour of words will be re-
ported. Because no unequivocal conclusion can be drawn from these studies,
we undertook some additional experiments. In the third paragraph we present
this series of four experiments.
2. Previous studies
Numbers have a persuasive advantage over words in the sense that they are
precise, they allow calculations and they have a fixed rank-order. A 100% is
always more than 75%. Words are, in comparison, vaguer, they do not allow
calculations and they are more variably interpretable [14]. This disadvantage of
words is visible in the quite consistent finding that the interpretation of verbally
expressed probabilities is context-dependent [15,16]. If winning a lottery is
‘possible’, entering the lottery may generally be seen as a good thing to do,
while if encountering a much disliked person at a party is ‘possible’, going to
that party is generally not judged to be wise. Moreover, personal opinions
about the consequences of the events referred to result in individual variations
in the meanings assigned to probability expressions [17]. Some people may not
mind meeting a disliked person or even enjoy the confrontation, others may
definitely wish to avoid it.
Studies of numerical versus verbal probabilities generally ask subjects to
translate numerical expressions into words and vice versa. In such studies, re-
searchers have found a great overlap between subject variability in the numer-
ical values assigned to verbal probabilities and great overlap between the words
(see among others [18,19]). Much less within and between subject variability was
found in the numerical probability expressions subjects used when asked to
describe a graphical representation of chance than in the verbal expressions they
used [20]. Subjects were found to be consistent with themselves in their inter-
pretations of verbal expressions, but much less so with others [21].
Physicians are no exceptions. When they were asked to give the meanings of
verbal probability expressions by marking them on a 0–100 percentage scale
[22] or when they were asked to translate verbal expressions into numerical
expressions ([23], see also [24]) physicians regularly gave dierent interpretat-
ions. When probability information was communicated by verbal expressions,
interpretations were also found to be highly imprecise, presumably because
they were influenced by the severity of the consequences associated with the
information [25]. For example, ‘‘low probability of infection’’ was interpreted
dierently than ‘‘low risk of death’’.
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Most of the authors referred to above conclude that physicians should use
numerical, not verbal, expressions of probability (see also [26]). Verbal proba-
bility expressions may lead to confusion, therefore numbers should be used [21].
However, ceteris paribus, verbal expressions of probability are perceived as
more natural than numerical probabilities, easier to understand and commu-
nicate and better suited to convey the vagueness of one’s opinions [14]. But this
may be annotated. Erev and Cohen [27] detected an interesting phenomenon,
which they dubbed the ‘communication mode preference paradox’ (CMP). The
subjects in their study preferred to receive precise, i.e. numerical, information,
but they knew that their own opinions were imprecise and therefore preferred
to express them in, vaguer, verbal terms. Other researchers found that one
person in three prefers numbers for both expressing and receiving information,
the second prefers words for both, and the third indeed betrays Erev and
Cohen’s communication mode preference paradox [28]. But this preference was
not firm, neither for Erev and Cohen’s subjects nor for the subjects in a study
by Rapoport and colleagues [29]. Subjects were found to be willing and able to
use both modes of expression.
Brun and Teigen [15] found that physicians preferred to use words in
communicating probabilities to their patients. Other researchers report similar
results. Physicians and other health workers express and process probabilities
in verbal rather than numerical form [25,30]. Physicians rarely reason using
numerical probabilities, and if they do, they tend to make errors [31,32].
Kuipers and colleagues [30] conclude that to physicians, subjective probabili-
ties are not numbers.
Brun and Teigen pursued their inquiry and discovered what could be called
a variation of the communication mode preference paradox, with physicians
and their patients. While physicians preferred to use words and thought their
patients would understand words more easily, the patients, on the contrary,
preferred to receive information in numbers and reported that numbers were
easier to understand. But the patients did not understand the numbers in
accordance with the physicians’ intention. For example, a physician would
state a 35% probability of having a disease and thereby intend to communicate
a moderate probability. Some patients might then understand that they had a
very real probability of indeed having the disease and be more alarmed than the
physician meant them to be, while others would understand it as less than 50%
chance and overestimate their well-being (compare also [33]). Numbers may, in
short, wrongly suggest a precision of opinion [21]. Brun and Teigen [15] con-
clude that numbers should not self-evidently be preferred to words in a medical
context. O’Brien [34] is of the same opinion. He concludes that the two modes
of communicating probability, numerical and verbal, can both be used. The
argument that verbal expressions are too vague in meaning to be used in
medicine is counter-balanced by indications from survey results that numbers
have very little meaning for the average member of the public.
172 S. Renooij, C. Witteman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 22 (1999) 169–194
Another argument that words would be at least equally suitable to express
probabilities as numbers is that it appears that whether people receive infor-
mation in verbal or in numerical form, does not influence either the subsequent
thought processes or the actions based on the information. The overall quality
of decisions in the two communication modes as well as the judgement pro-
cesses were found to be similar [14]. The two did dier, in that with numbers,
judges used the 50% category much more often than the tossup category was
used in the verbal mode; and overconfidence was systematically greater given
verbal than numerical probability expressions. However, neither the numerical
nor the verbal mode was found to result in uniformly better processing than the
other. The conclusion seems to be that there are no grounds to prefer either
numerical or verbal probability expressions as the better medium (cf. also
[20,27,35–37]).
It has also been suggested that in some situations clearly interpretable verbal
expressions are preferable to numbers. For example, Wallsten et al. [28] advise
probability judgements to be elicited in verbal form whenever possible, except
when there is a large amount of specific data at hand and numerical proba-
bilities may be justified, because the use of verbal expressions seems to be more
comfortable to people than the use of numbers. For medical diagnostic net-
works it has been suggested that, even if verbal expressions would be less
precise than numerical expressions, imprecision of probabilities does not entail
a deterioration in the average performance of a belief network [8,38,39]. This
suggestion awaits further corroboration.
Limiting the number of verbal expressions in a scale might, however, be
advisable. The use of some verbal expressions should be avoided, to wit those
for which the variation in interpretation is found to be high. This is especially
the case with expressions in the central range such as possible or likely. Ex-
pressions for the extremes of the range, that is: impossible and certain, are
much less variably interpreted and could be used [40]. A small number of
carefully selected expressions seems best [21,41], or a table could be presented
codifying the numerical meaning of the verbal phrases (compare among others
[42,43]). Physicians could then continue to use verbal expressions if they prefer,
but with more consistency of terminology [25].
A scale with a small number of expressions is recommended because it
would be easier on people’s cognitive capacities. It is easier to distinguish
some seven information categories or expressions clearly than it is to de-
marcate the meanings of a long list of expressions [44,45]. Other studies have
used lists of 18 expressions [20] or 19 [21,42] or 34 in a long list and 14 in a
shorter version [15], as few as two [35] or as many as 52 [17]. These lists were
compiled by the researchers, which does not guarantee that people would
actually use them. Indeed, Zimmer [46] found that when subjects were asked
directly for verbal descriptions of probability, the mean number of expres-
sions used was 5.44.
S. Renooij, C. Witteman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 22 (1999) 169–194 173
Dierences in interpretation of the verbal expressions may be prevented
when the expressions are oered with a pre-defined rank-order, in a scale.
Indeed, Hamm [42] found that subjects were less variable in assigning (nu-
merical) meanings to expressions in an ordered list than to expressions in a
random list and that ordered lists produced more accurate responses than
random lists. A pre-defined rank-order would not be artificial, because an
encouraging between subject consistency was found in the rank ordering of
verbal probability expressions by general practitioners [34], and individuals
were found to have a relatively stable rank ordering of verbal probability
phrases over time [21,47].
Our suggestion is that when probabilities are elicited from experts, for
example when constructing a belief network, the experts be shown a scale,
depicted graphically as a vertical line with numbers on the one side and words
on the other. When experts are more comfortable with numbers, they may
refer to the number side of the scale and when they prefer to express their
opinions in words, they may refer to the verbal expressions. This same double
scale might then be oered as reference when the output of the belief network
is given.
Summing up the above (compare [48]), there is sucient justification for an
attempt to construct a scale which includes both numerical and verbal ex-
pressions of probability. Merz et al. [25] proposed a six-expression verbal scale
to be used as a standard by physicians, which covers the whole probability
range: extremely high probability, very high, high, low, very low and extremely
low probability. Although this scale does have the elegant properties of being
very simple and symmetrical, the use of qualifiers such as ‘very’ has been found
to introduce additional vagueness [49] and we will therefore try to avoid it.
3. Our study
We undertook four successive studies to develop a scale of verbal proba-
bility expressions, usable in combination with a numerical probability scale.
We took into account the possibility that the context in which these expressions
are elicited and presented influences their interpretation. And because decision
support systems such as belief networks are often used in the domain of
medical diagnosis, we included medical subjects. In study 1 we asked subjects
which verbal probability expressions they commonly use. In study 2 we asked
(other) subjects to rank order the expressions from study 1. In study 3 we asked
subjects to make pairwise comparisons between each pair of expressions, to
determine how the words should be projected on a numerical probability scale.
Studies 2 and 3 are unlike the experiments most other researchers have done.
We never asked subjects to directly translate words into numbers or vice versa.
In study 4 we tested whether decisions were influenced by the mode, verbal or
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numerical, in which probability information was presented, using the scale that
had resulted from the previous three studies for the verbal expressions.
3.1. First experiment
In this first study we aimed at a list of commonly used probability expres-
sions. Most researchers use a dictionary or published articles to draw up a list
of probability expressions. Since we had no a priori reason to assume that such
sources contain only the expressions actually used and think they are more
likely to list all linguistic possibilities, we designed a short questionnaire with
which we approached the subjects.
3.1.1. Procedure
The participants received a short questionnaire. In the first paragraph they
were asked for their co-operation by generating a list of commonly used verbal
terms expressing (im)probability. Examples were given, such as ‘‘it is unlikely
that I will pass my exam’’ or ‘‘I will probably go to Amsterdam this weekend’’.
Instructions were given, in the second paragraph, to write down a list of terms
judged suitable in situations where one wishes to express a degree of
(im)probability, for example about the chance of rain tomorrow. Subjects were
reminded to only list expressions they thought were common, and to try them
out for themselves in dierent virtual situations. At the end of the page they
were asked for their gender, year of birth and profession or study.
3.1.2. Subjects
There were 53 participants, 47 students (Computer Science, Psychology and
Artificial Intelligence), and six faculty members, 23 female and 30 male, whose
age ranged between 18 and 54 with an average of 23 (SD 8.7).
3.1.3. Results
The 53 participants together generated 144 dierent expressions. They wrote
down a mean of 8.2 expressions per participant (SD 4.1). Of these 144 ex-
pressions, 108 (75%) were composed of a probability term plus a modifier such
as ‘very’ or ‘reasonably’. Some modifiers seemed synonymous, but we counted
the phrases containing such modifiers, e.g. ‘almost possible’ and ‘nearly pos-
sible’, as dierent phrases. 95 expressions (66%) were used by only one par-
ticipant and another 17 (11%) by only two participants. Table 1 lists the seven
expressions that were used by 15 or more, or almost 30%, of the participants. 2
The next often used term was written down by 11 subjects, a couple of
2 Translations of the original Dutch phrases ‘mogelijk, waarschijnlijk, onwaarschijnlijk, zeker,
onzeker, te verwachten, onmogelijk’.
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expressions were given by nine and eight subjects, respectively, the rest had
a frequency near one. Looking at the composite expressions as a check of
common use, the dierence in frequency between our list of seven and the rest
was even greater.
3.1.4. Discussion
Most other researchers use lists of expressions they have compiled them-
selves, by scanning literature or borrowing from others. Clark [50] proposed
the method we used, to ask subjects to generate lists of commonly used ex-
pressions. He had fewer subjects (20), who generated more expressions each,
with a mean of 12.9, than our 53 subjects, with a mean of 8.2. His most fre-
quently used expressions were ‘certain’, ‘possible’, ‘likely’, ‘definite’, ‘probable’,
‘unlikely’ and ‘impossible’. He thus also found seven expressions, quite com-
parable to ours. He also found more expressions on the positive side; that is:
from fifty–fifty towards certain, than on the negative side of the range, that is:
from fifty–fifty towards impossible.
In their attempt at codification of probability expressions, Mosteller and
Youtz [17] advised ‘impossible’ and ‘certain’ for the two extremes, and ‘even
chance’ for the mid-point. To cover the rest of the range, they advised ‘prob-
able’ with modifiers. However, we think expressions with modifiers may give
more rise to ambiguity than one-word expressions, therefore we decided for
our list of ‘possible’, ‘probable’ and ‘certain’ plus their negations, plus ‘ex-
pected’ because that was used relatively often by our subjects.
We used our list of seven frequently generated expressions for the next ex-
periments, adding one term, ‘undecided’ 3, to express fifty–fifty probability.
This list of eight expressions neatly kept us within Miller’s range of seven plus
or minus two. We expected to resolve the asymmetry between the number of
Table 1
Verbal probability expressions generated by participants in the first experiment (n 53), with their
frequencies
Expressions Frequency
Possible 38
Probable 30
Improbable 28
Certain 25
Uncertain 21
Expected 18
Impossible 15
3 In Dutch ‘onbeslist’.
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positive versus negative expressions in our next, ranking and scaling experi-
ments.
3.2. Second experiment
The second study was set up to determine if a single, stable rank order
existed for the eight probability expressions from the first study. In this study
we only looked for a rank order. Distances between the expressions are es-
tablished in the third experiment.
3.2.1. Design
Subjects were asked to rank order the eight probability expressions. We had
a context and a no context condition. In the no context condition the ex-
pressions were oered in isolation. In the context condition the probability
expressions were embedded in a (Dutch) sentence describing a medical situa-
tion (for example: It is certain that young people do not get varicose veins). In
both conditions we had medical students and other (Social Sciences) students
(see Table 2).
3.2.2. Procedure
Subjects received a one-page questionnaire. At the top of the page the task
was introduced and instructions were given. The instructions were the same in
both conditions, that is to order the eight expressions, be they presented in
isolation or embedded in a sentence, by assigning a ranking number to each.
The number 1 was to be given to the expression denoting the highest level of
probability and subsequent numbers to expressions denoting subsequently less
probability. Assignment of the same rank to more than one expression was
allowed (compare [50]). Then the eight expressions or sentences were presented,
listed vertically, indented and double-spaced. Presentation order was arbi-
trarily set to possible, impossible, uncertain, certain, probable, improbable,
expected and undecided in the no context condition and to probable, im-
probable, possible, undecided, impossible, uncertain, expected and certain in
the context condition. At the bottom of the page subjects were asked for their
gender, year of birth and profession or study and thanked for their co-oper-
ation.
Table 2
Design of the ranking experiment, with number of subjects in each group
Medical subjects Other subjects
No context Group 1, n 26 Group 2, n 26
Context Group 3, n 21 Group 4, n 22
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3.2.3. Subjects
Of the no context groups, group 1 consisted of 15 female and 11 male
medical students. Their ages ranged from 19 to 45 years, with an average of 21
(SD 5). Group 2 consisted of 19 female and 7 male Social Sciences students.
Their ages ranged from 18 to 29, with an average of 21 (SD 2.5). Of the
context groups, group 3 consisted of 13 female and 8 male medical students,
with ages ranging from 19 to 32 with an average of 22.5 (SD 5). Group 4
consisted of 19 female and 3 male Social Sciences students, whose ages ranged
from 19 to 26 with an average of 21 (SD 1.6).
3.2.4. Data analysis
We analysed the between-group variance of the mean ranks given by the
subjects to the eight probability expressions with a one-way ANOVA (ANal-
ysis Of VAriance). Because we found some significant dierences, we then
analysed the data with a non-linear principal components technique developed
by the University of Leiden PRINCALS, an acronym for principal compo-
nents analysis by alternating least squares [51]. It may be used for ordinal data.
Important for our study, PRINCALS can compute solutions that reduce the
orderings of all subjects together to one or more dimensions and indicate the
quality (eigenvalue, max. 1) of the solution on each dimension. We assumed
that the subjects all did their ordering along the one dimension of level of
probability. To test this assumption, we had PRINCALS compute a solution in
two dimensions. If our assumption was correct, then the solution on one di-
mension would have a high quality and on the other dimension the quality
would be low enough to be able to discard it.
3.2.5. Results
ANOVA. Four subjects in group 1 and one subject in group 4 had to be
excluded from the ANOVA analyses because they had given an incomplete
ordering.
The ANOVA analyses revealed that the four groups of subjects had assigned
significantly dierent mean ranks to five of the eight terms: possible, impos-
sible, improbable, expected and certain. 4 Post Hoc tests using Tukey’s HSD-
procedure showed that for these five expressions it were only the with context
and without context group means that diered significantly at a 0.05 , while
there were no significant dierences between medical subjects and other sub-
jects for any of the expressions.
4 With F(3,86) for possible 4.018, p 0.01, for impossible 4.605, p 0.005, for improba-
ble 5.684, p 0.001, for expected 4.481, p 0.006 and for certain 4.390, p 0.006.
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Since the only factor that influenced dierences in mean rankings was
context, we present in Table 3 the mean rankings of the two no context groups
together (groups 1 and 2) and the two context groups together (groups 3 and 4).
3.2.6. Discussion
We concluded that context did indeed appear to influence the ranking of the
expressions but that the medical subjects and the others did not dier in their
rankings.
We present our results next to those of other researchers. These other studies
were all ranking experiments in which the expressions were presented without a
context, so we include only our no context results. To facilitate comparison, we
rescaled the means of the other four studies onto a 1–8 scale (see Table 4).
Table 4
Mean ranks (and standard deviations) of the eight probability expressions by the subjects in the no
context condition (groups 1 and 2) and as reported by Tavana et al. [52], by Budescu and Wallsten
[21] and by Clark [50] (studies 5.4 and 5.2)
This study,
no context
Tavana Budescu Clark
Study 5.4 Study 5.2
n  48 n  30 n  32 n  16 n  16
Certain 1.15 (0.94) 1.05 – – 1.36
Probable 2.70 (0.78) – 2.80 2.83 2.56
Expected 2.65 (0.85) – – 2.62 –
Possible 3.81 (0.52) 5.29 4.71 3.61 3.62
Undecided 5.69 (1.22) – – – –
Uncertain 5.96 (0.87) – 4.94 5.38 5.94
Improbable 6.44 (0.84) – 6.22 6.45 6.83
Impossible 7.61 (0.99) 8.00 – 7.87 7.90
Table 3
Mean ranks (and standard deviations) of the eight probability expressions, by the subjects in the no
context condition (groups 1 and 2) and the subjects in the context condition (groups 3 and 4)
No context Context
(n  48) (n  42)
Certain 1.15 (0.94) 2.26 (2.46)
Probable 2.70 (0.78) 3.29 (1.89)
Expected 2.65 (0.85) 3.57 (1.49)
Possible 3.81 (0.52) 4.56 (1.76)
Undecided 5.69 (1.22) 5.40 (1.56)
Uncertain 5.96 (0.87) 5.50 (1.46)
Improbable 6.44 (0.84) 5.13 (2.16)
Impossible 7.61 (0.99) 6.29 (2.33)
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Where there were expressions in common, the correspondence between our
results and the other four is satisfactory.
Although other researchers generally only present means, we feel uncom-
fortable calculating mean ranks. The subjects only assigned rank numbers, not
distances between the expressions, so the data are ordinal. If an expression is
ranked fourth, that does not necessarily mean that it refers to twice as much
improbability as an expression ranked second. Also, the high standard devia-
tions for the mean ranks of the context group (compare Table 3) are dicult to
explain by just calculating means. Possibly the subjects did not rank the ex-
pressions on the one dimension of no to complete probability, but on another
dimension as well. To check this, we performed additional PRINCALS ana-
lyses.
PRINCALS. No subjects had to be excluded for the PRINCALS analyses,
as they had been from the ANOVA analyses, because PRINCALS can be
performed with missing data. PRINCALS reveals the order underlying the
rankings of the expressions by the dierent subjects.
For both groups in the no context condition a solution was found in one
dimension for most subjects, with an eigenvalue of 0.9175 for group 1 and
0.9500 for group 2. For two medical subjects and one other subject a high
quality solution was found on the second dimension. Because on inspection of
their answers there seemed to be no logical explanation to their orderings, we
presumed that these three subjects had misunderstood the task and we ex-
cluded their data. The preference orderings for the eight probability expres-
sions of the rest of the subjects, 24 in group 1 and 25 in group 2, were quite the
same. Since the ANOVA analyses had shown that there were no dierences
between medical subjects and others, we took these two together as the no
context group. A high quality solution with an eigenvalue of 0.9504 was found
in one dimension, with the expressions in the order presented in the first col-
umn in Table 5.
For the two groups in the context condition, the second dimension was
important. For the medical subjects (group 3), a high quality solution with an
eigenvalue of 0.9550 was found in one dimension for 12 of the subjects, with
comparable preference orderings, while nine subjects scored high on the second
dimension. For the other subjects (group 4), a high quality solution with an
eigenvalue of 0.9515 was found for 11 of the 22 subjects on the first dimension,
with the same preference orderings, while the other 11 subjects scored high on
the second dimension.
The nine medical subjects and 11 others who scored high on the second
dimension appeared to have judged the probability that the sentences in which
the expressions were embedded were truthful statements instead of judging the
expressions themselves. As an illustration, one of these subjects judged ‘im-
probable’ in the sentence ‘‘It is improbable that someone with tonsillitis does
not have a sore throat’’ to express the highest level of probability and ‘possible’
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in the sentence ‘‘It is possible that someone faints from the heat’’ to express the
lowest level of probability. But taking together these apparently sentence-
ranking subjects did not reveal an understandable pattern. We speculate that
another factor had influenced these rankings, possibly familiarity with the
complaint for the medical students and everyday beliefs about such complaints
for the other students.
Again taking the medical subjects and the others together, and excluding the
subjects who seemed not to have followed our instructions to rank order the
expressions, we found a high quality solution with an eigenvalue of 0.9652 for
both groups in the context condition together with the expressions ordered as
shown in the second column of Table 5.
3.2.7. Discussion
Surprisingly, the term we had introduced as the mid-point (‘undecided’) was
ranked last by the subjects in the no context condition. Looking back to the
calculated means of this expression in Table 3, we also see a high standard
deviation. Clearly, the interpretation of ‘undecided’ is not unambiguous. An
explanation may possibly be the order of presentation: ‘undecided’ was the last
expression in the list.
Our PRINCALS analyses showed that not all subjects in the context con-
dition rank-ordered the expressions. Almost half of them gave rankings on a
second dimension. This was not true for the subjects in the no context con-
dition. We therefore conclude that context does not influence the rank ordering
of the expressions themselves, but context does seem to distract subjects from
the actual task.
We performed a final analysis over all four groups in the two conditions who
had ranked the expressions on one dimension (n 72). Their rankings could be
Table 5
Rank order of the eight expressions of probability for the medical subjects and the other subjects in
the no context condition (groups 1 and 2) and the medical and other subjects in the context
condition (groups 3 and 4)
No context condition
groups 1 and 2
Context condition
groups 3 and 4
n  49 n  23
Certain 1 1
Probable 3 2.5
Possible 3 4
Expected 3 2.5
Improbable 5.5 6
Uncertain 5.5 6
Undecided 8 6
Impossible 7 8
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summarised in one dimension with an eigenvalue of 0.9658, representing the
order: certain, probable, expected, possible, (uncertain, improbable, undecid-
ed), impossible. Because in our opinion the PRINCALS analyses are more
appropriate than the mean rank orderings, we summarise the results of this
second experiment as revealing the following rank order of our eight expres-
sions: certain and impossible at the extremes, with probable, expected and
possible, in that order, expressing less probability from the certain-side down,
and uncertain, improbable and undecided toward the impossible-side.
3.3. Third experiment
We were not satisfied with an order of expressions only, but we also wished
to establish whether two (or more) expressions were taken to mean almost the
same or were quite distinguishable in meaning. In other words, we wanted to
know the ‘distances’ between the expressions. We therefore set up a third study,
in which we asked subjects to rate sameness of or dierence between expres-
sions. We expected to find that ‘certain’ and ‘impossible’ would be judged as
extremely dierent, while ‘possible’, ‘probable’ and ‘expected’ might be rather
similar.
3.3.1. Procedure
In the third experiment we asked subjects for pairwise comparison, that is:
for similarity judgements among all pairs of verbal probability expressions, to
uncover the underlying structure of relationships among them [53,54]. For the
eight expressions, there were 28 pairs to compare. A similarity judgement was
made by scoring each pair of expressions on a 10 cm line, using as anchors the
expressions ‘exact same’ and ‘completely dierent’. Each judgement was made
on a separate sheet of paper. The order of presentation was random across
subjects and across stimulus pairs, and, for a pair AB, half the subjects received
A first while the other half received B first. Subjects performed four practice
runs before starting the real experimental judgements.
3.3.2. Subjects
We had two groups of subjects, again one group with a medical background
and one comparable group with no medical background. Subjects in group 1
were 28 Medical Biology students, 12 female and 16 male. Their age range was
between 19 and 25, with an average of 20 (SD 1.5). Subjects in group 2 were
56 Computer Science students, 13 female and 43 male, with ages ranging from
20 to 53, an average of 24 (SD 4).
3.3.3. Data analysis
The judgement of (dis)similarity between each pair of expressions for each
subject was scored in millimeters, read from a ruler placed against the 10 cm
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line. For each subject a data matrix was drawn up, in lower triangular form
with zeros on the diagonals.
The matrices were analysed with a Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS)
technique. MDS takes a set of distances between objects and creates the ‘map’
by computing the positions (co-ordinates) of the objects.
We used the SPSS module ALSCAL (Alternating Least-Squares Scaling) as
our MDS procedure [55]. The type of MDS we used was Replicated MDS,
which computes a single MDS solution for all matrices together and uses the
Euclidean distance model (an n-dimensional version of the Pythagorean the-
orem) as scaling model. The data were treated as continuous ordinal data (i.e.
ties within the matrices were untied) and as matrix conditional (i.e. the meaning
of the numbers in a matrix is conditional on the subject). Since all probability
expressions seemed to be comparable, we did an analysis in only one dimen-
sion.
ALSCAL produces a list of co-ordinates for the eight probability expres-
sions. These co-ordinates are such that their fit with the distances between the
expressions given by the dierent subjects is as good as possible. We mapped
the co-ordinates of the expressions onto a probability scale, by setting as an-
chors the extreme expressions (certain and impossible) representing 100% and
0% probability, respectively, and then using a linear function to calculate the
probabilities of the other expressions (compare [52]).
3.3.4. Results
3.3.4.1. Medical students. An initial ALSCAL analysis of the matrices of the
medical students, group 1, showed that the matrices of two subjects did not fit
the calculated co-ordinates. Upon inspection of the matrices of these two
subjects, this bad fit seemed to be the result of their judgement of certain and
impossible as very similar (a distance of 1 mm on the 10 cm line, where one
would expect the full 10 cm).
We removed the data from these two subjects and did another analysis with
the remaining 26 matrices. The co-ordinates of the eight expressions are given
in the left half of the leftmost double column of Table 6 below. The right half
of this double column presents a mapping of these co-ordinates onto a
probability scale from one to zero, calculated with the function probability
 co-ordinate 1:4572=2:6522.
3.3.4.2. Other students. An initial analysis of the matrices of the other students,
group 2, showed that the matrices of four subjects had to be removed because
of their poor fit. The analysis with the remaining 52 matrices gave the co-
ordinates of the eight expressions as given in the left half of the middle double
column of Table 6. The right half of this column presents a mapping of these
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co-ordinates onto a probability scale, calculated with the function probability
 co-ordinate 1:5394=2:8346.
3.3.4.3. All subjects. We performed a final analysis over the two groups, thus
over the 78 matrices. The right double column of Table 6 presents the results
of this analysis, again with the calculated probabilities, with the function
probability  co-ordinate 1:5075=2:7813.
3.3.5. Discussion
The calculated probabilities of ‘probable’ and ‘possible’ are close together in
the final analysis, and dierent (and inverted) with the medical students and the
other students, suggesting they could be taken to refer to the same range on the
scale and that one of them can be removed. We will leave out ‘possible’, be-
cause its calculated probabilities dier most in the two groups. Note that the
calculated probabilities for ‘undecided’ are very dierent for the two groups as
well. Since it was again (compare experiment 2) not interpreted as intended,
that is for the mid-point, we decided to leave out this term as well. This leaves
us with a scale without a mid-point, so we add one term which can hardly be
misunderstood, ’fifty–fifty’, although one can argue whether this really is a
verbal probability expression.
Upon closer inspection of the matrices, we saw that the positive–negative
pairs certain–uncertain and possible–impossible were judged by most subjects
as 100% dissimilar. Taking all expressions into consideration, ‘uncertain’ and
‘possible’ may be expected to be at some distance from the extremes ‘impos-
sible’ and ‘certain’, but our method of eliciting pair-wise dissimilarity judge-
ments artificially forced interpretation of the expressions toward the endpoints
of the scale.
We thus feel justified to slightly reinterpret the calculated probabilities to-
ward the mid-point, resulting in the scale with seven categories presented in
Table 7, which we will use in our next and final experiment.
Table 6
Co-ordinates and calculated probability points for the eight expressions of group 1, medical stu-
dents (n 26), group 2, other students (n 52) and all subjects together (n 78)
Expression Group 1 Group 2 All subjects
Co-ord. Prob. Co-ord. Prob. Co-ord. Prob.
Certain 1.1950 1.00 1.2952 1.00 1.2738 1.00
Possible 1.0897 0.96 0.8284 0.84 0.9105 0.86
Probable 0.8409 0.87 0.9252 0.87 0.9043 0.86
Expected 0.7239 0.82 0.7211 0.80 0.7133 0.79
Undecided ÿ0.5972 0.32 ÿ0.3730 0.41 ÿ0.4394 0.38
Uncertain ÿ0.7210 0.28 ÿ0.8139 0.26 ÿ0.7939 0.25
Improbable ÿ1.0741 0.14 ÿ1.0435 0.17 ÿ1.0610 0.16
Impossible ÿ1.4572 0.00 ÿ1.5394 0.00 ÿ1.5075 0.00
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3.4. Fourth experiment
Our fourth experiment was designed to test the translations of the verbal
probability expressions in our scale into the calculated numerical probabilities.
In contrast to what most other researchers have done, we did not ask subjects
to translate words into numbers or vice versa. We think that having to give
such a translation is an artificial task, not true to actual cognitive processes
(compare [50]). It may not capture how people actually use words and numbers
for probability. However, we did need to validate our translations. We did so
by comparing the decisions subjects made when they were oered probability
information in verbal form to their decisions when the information was pre-
sented numerically. If the calculated probability points indeed have the same
meaning as the verbal probability expressions, decision makers will make
similar decisions with the probability information presented verbally and nu-
merically. This would be even more convincing if the decisions were also made
with comparable confidence. For example, we expect that when subjects de-
cide, with high confidence, to cancel an appointment when they are informed
that rail-workers will ‘probably’ continue their strike, they also decide, highly
confidently, to cancel their appointment when rail-workers continue their strike
with 85% probability.
3.4.1. Procedure
Subjects received a two-page questionnaire, with an introduction followed
by six decision situations. Each decision situation was described in two or three
lines. To give an example:
Ms. T. has a non-serious physical complaint, which does however need to
be treated. The probability that Ms. T. is allergic to the usually prescribed
drug H. is ..... There are alternative drugs for her complaint, but these are
less eective.
Do you prescribe drug H?
Table 7
Final scale with seven categories of probability expressions plus their calculated probability points
Expression Probability (%)
I Certain 100
II Probable 85
III Expected 75
IV Fifty–fifty 50
V Uncertain 25
VI Improbable 15
VII Impossible 0
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Each of the six descriptions was followed by a table that contained either the
seven verbal probability expressions or the seven numerical probabilities (see
Table 7), with each of these seven followed by ‘‘decision: yes/no’’ (to be circled)
and by a 2-cm line on which subjects were to check their measure of confidence
in their decision (from complete to none).
The subjects were instructed to mentally write, on the dots in the descrip-
tion, each of the expressions in turn, to make a yes/no decision for that hy-
pothetical situation and to check their confidence. Each subject thus made
seven decisions plus confidence checks, for each of the six situations.
We had four versions of the questionnaire. Version one started with three
situations (A, B and C) with verbal expressions, followed by three situations
(D, E and F) with the numerical probabilities. Version two contained the same
six situations in the same order, but now with situations A, B and C with
numerical probabilities and situations D, E and F with verbal expressions. In
versions three and four the six situations were given in the order D, E, F fol-
lowed by A, B, C, with version three starting with verbal expressions and
version four with the numerical probabilities.
The tables of expressions and probabilities, each of which occurred three
times in a questionnaire, were first given in the order we had determined (as in
Table 7), then twice in a dierent random order.
3.4.2. Subjects
There were 123 participants (students and faculty members of Computer
Science, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, and Medicine), 59 female and 64
male, whose ages ranged from 18 to 61 (mean of 28, SD 9.7).
3.4.3. Data analysis
We had to remove the answers of 12 of the 123 subjects, because they had
misunderstood the assignment and had made a decision for only one category
in each situation. Of the 110 subjects left, 52 answered version one or three of
the questionnaire and 58 subjects answered version two or four.
For each of the six situations we have a verbal and a numerical answering
mode. In each mode a yes or no decision was made for seven probability
categories. With these three variables (mode, decision and category) we con-
structed a three-way table for each situation. In the cells of the tables we have
the total number of subjects who made a certain decision in a certain mode for
a certain category. For example: 34 subjects decided ‘n’ (no) in mode V (verbal)
for category IV (‘fifty–fifty’). The same three-way tables, with mode-decision-
category, were drawn up with the cells containing the subjects’ confidence. We
measured the confidence subjects had in their decisions by scoring their checks
on the confidence line. Complete confidence was counted as 1.0, no confidence
as 0.0. We looked both at the confidence of all subjects together for each mode-
decision-category tuple, and the mean confidence for each tuple. This gave us
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another two sets of six three-way tables with in each cell the total and the mean
confidence, respectively.
We analysed our three-way tables using a log-linear analysis (the log of the
expected cell frequencies is a linear function of the log of the observed fre-
quencies of the variables). We tried to find a log-linear model that describes all
important associations between the variables, in our case mode, with values
N(umeric) and V(erbal), decision, with values y(es) and n(o), and category,
with values I through VII.
A log-linear model describes the associations between variables. For ex-
ample: the model ‘‘Category  Decision  Mode’’ describes three-way asso-
ciation, between all three variables; the model ‘‘Category  Decision + Mode’’
indicates that only Category and Decision are associated and that Mode is
unrelated to either.
Fitting a log linear model is a process of deciding which associations are
significantly dierent from zero. A model that includes these significant asso-
ciations fits the data, that is: explains the observed frequencies.
It is known that the tests used to determine the fit are somewhat too liberal,
especially if some expected cell frequencies are small. Therefore, Darlington
[56] suggests correcting the observed frequencies before computing the fit. This
continuity correction consists of adjusting each value of the observed fre-
quencies by 0.25 toward its own expected frequency. We used this correction in
situations where no simple model would fit the data and we thought this could
be caused by small cell frequencies. Note that especially the situations with the
extreme probability categories (I and VII) will probably have small cell fre-
quencies for one of the decisions.
We performed separate analyses for the decisions, over the tables with the
total number of subjects per cell, and for the confidence, over the tables with
total confidence per cell and those with mean confidence per cell.
3.4.4. Results
3.4.4.1. Decisions. For five of the six situations we could directly choose
‘‘Category  Decision + Mode’’ as the best model. 5 In other words: the de-
cisions were related to the category of the probability expression, and not re-
lated to the mode, verbal or numerical, in which the probabilities were given.
In the sixth situation the only model that fit initially was ‘‘Category 
Decision Mode’’, which will always fit. We therefore performed a continuity
correction on our data. Then the same model as for the other five situations
5 v2 2.876, p 0.998; v2 15.468, p 0.279; v2 16.085, p 0.245; v2 9.438, p 0.739 and
v2 9.261, p 0.753; df 13 for all tables, respectively.
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had the best fit, but it was not quite convincing. 6 Examining the cells, we
retraced the sub optimality to one category: the proportion of yes : no decisions
in category V diered a factor 4 between the numerical mode (25%) and the
verbal mode (uncertain).
3.4.4.2. Confidence. For the tables with the total confidence per cell we could,
again, directly see that ‘‘Category  Decision + Mode’’ was the best model for
four out of the six situations. 7 This means that the confidence subjects had in
their decisions was related to the category of the probability expression, and
not related to the mode (verbal or numerical) in which the probabilities were
given.
In one of the two remaining situations the model ‘‘Category  Deci-
sion + Mode  Decision’’ was initially significantly better. However, after we
performed a continuity correction on our data the same ‘‘Category  Deci-
sion + Mode’’ model was again the best model. 8
In the other remaining situation the only model that fit was ‘‘Category 
Decision Mode’’. Performing a continuity correction did not change this. In
this situation we again had a big dierence in the proportion of yes:no deci-
sions for the two modes of category V. Deleting category V and a continuity
correction again showed ‘‘CategoryDecision + Mode’’ to be the best model. 9
Analyses of the tables with mean confidence per cell showed that in the six
situations there was no dierence in the subjects’ mean confidence in their
decisions and no dierence between the subjects’ mean confidence for decisions
in the verbal mode and in the numerical mode. Subjects were consistent in their
confidence judgements over situations as well as in the two modes.
3.4.5. Discussion
Our analyses showed that the decisions subjects made depended only on the
probability category used in the description and that the decisions were not
influenced by the mode in which the probability information was presented.
We did find that category V caused some problems in some situations. This
could indicate that to some subjects ‘uncertain’ and ‘25%’ does not mean the
same. Indeed, to some people ‘uncertain’ may mean anything less than a 100%
certain, others could interpret ‘uncertain’ to mean the same as ‘fifty–fifty’.
However, this problem only occurred in the situations where the probabili-
ty categories were presented in random order. It did not occur when the
6 v2 20.342, p 0.087, df 13.
7 I2 2.574, p 0.999; v2 12.541, p 0.484; v2 7.520, p 0.873 and v2 9.208, p 0.757;
df 13 for all tables, respectively.
8 v2 13.138, p 0.437, df 13.
9 v2 15.287, p 0.170, df 13.
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probabilities were presented in order. In fact, the best model values were those
for the situations in which the ordered lists were presented. 10 We conclude that
when the probability expressions are presented in an ordered list, they will be
interpreted as intended.
We may conclude that context influences the decisions people make, but
because we only found dierences in decisions between the situations and not
per situation between the verbal or numerical mode, the two modes are in-
terchangeable and neither is better or worse. Our results suggest that the
agreement between the calculated probability points and the verbal probability
expressions, given in Table 7, is reliable.
3.5. Conclusions
In some situations people prefer to express and process probabilities in
verbal rather than numerical form. Knowledge-based systems such as belief
networks on the other hand always internally represent and compute proba-
bilities numerically. This means that experts are required to state their prob-
abilities numerically and to understand explanations containing numbers. We
suggest that this communication problem would be reduced if there were to
exist an acceptable representation of a probability scale that contained mutu-
ally exchangeable verbal and numerical expressions.
Our first three experiments provided us with an ordered list of seven com-
monly used verbal probability expressions, which together span the whole
scale. Unlike other researchers we did not use a pre-set list but we worked with
the expressions people themselves said they most commonly used. Our ex-
periments diered from others in another important aspect. We did not ask
people to translate numerical expressions into numbers or vice versa. In our
opinion, asking for such a translation forces subjects to use two dierent
mental representations of probability at the same time and to look for a
mapping between the two. We addressed only one representation, thereby
avoiding possible confusion. We tried to construct a scale for the verbal rep-
resentation of probability, the numerical scale being quite straightforward. In
order to present the two together along one scale, we needed numerical
equivalents for the verbal expressions. We used the dissimilarities of the third
experiment to determine this mapping of verbal expressions onto a numerical
scale.
It is often said that numbers are better than words, because words are more
variably interpretable, the meaning being influenced by, among other things,
context and personal opinions. The assumption then is that numerical prob-
abilities are always interpreted in the same way and that, since a verbal
10 v2  2.876, p 0.998 for the decisions and v2  2.547, p 0.999 for the confidence.
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expression is translated into dierent numerical expressions, the verbal ex-
pression is too vague. Obviously, uncertainty is always dealt with within a
context. This context can be either explicit, or people will implicitly think of
one. We assume that context not only influences the interpretation of verbal
probability expressions, but that it influences the interpretation of a numerical
probability expression as well. For example, if ‘‘low probability of infection’’
and ‘‘low probability of death’’ are interpreted dierently, then so will ‘‘a 23%
chance of infection’’ and ‘‘a 23% chance of death’’. For expressing uncertainty,
numbers may be just as vague as words. Therefore, we should not ask people
whether they think that a low probability equals 25%, but we should test if, in a
certain context, they interpret ‘low probability’ the same as ‘25%’; that is: we
should test if people react the same to the verbal and the numerical expression,
if they take the same actions, make the same decisions. This is what we have
done in our last experiment.
This fourth experiment was designed to test the validity of our translations.
The finding that subjects made the same decisions, with the same confidence,
irrespective of whether information was communicated to them in terms of the
verbal expressions or in the corresponding numerical form, justifies the ten-
tative conclusion that this scale containing both is usable. Further study is now
called for to check the scale’s usability in the applied context of belief networks.
We are currently interviewing medical experts on cancer to get their probability
estimates for a belief network, the qualitative part of which they had already
constructed. Previous interviews, in which these experts where asked to state
their assessments numerically or to mark them on a horizontal line, were quite
unsuccessful. Now, with our double scale, elicitation proceeds much more ef-
fectively, to a much greater satisfaction of the experts [57]. Some probabilities
they easily give as a number, for others they use the verbal expressions and then
check the scale at or near the expression that best fits their estimate. We will
continue this study, and also set up a more systematic investigation into the
benefits of the use of the double scale. A more systematic study is also called
for into the explanations generated by the system, and the user’s ability to
understand these when they are oered the double scale as a reference.
There are some shortcomings to our study. We used Dutch subjects and
consequently Dutch words, which we translated into English for this paper.
Although we made no choices for the English words because dictionaries only
give the one translation for each term, we cannot be sure that the connotations
of the Dutch and the English words are similar. A replication with English
speaking subjects could verify this point. In some situations, our scale may
seem too coarse, containing too few verbal expressions. However, the expres-
sions are not meant to be presented as a list, but next to a graphical repre-
sentation of 0–100 scale. Users may check this scale right next to a word, or at
any point between two words. We propose a representation as shown in Fig. 1.
We found this scale to be quite usable to experts.
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We are not quite happy with the way the expression for the mid-point of the
scale was determined. First, because our subjects did not write down such a
term, we introduced ‘undecided’, after much thought. Its literal meaning may be
fifty–fifty, but in the experiments subjects did not appear to interpret it this way.
We then replaced it by ‘fifty–fifty’, which seems cheating on what may count as
verbal. Moreover, because we introduced this term later, the assumed distances
to the other terms was not established as it had been for the rest of the terms.
In spite of these shortcomings, we think we have shown how people’s
preferences for verbal probability expressions may be accommodated. This
may prove helpful in the construction of for example belief networks or other
systems that represent and process probability information.
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